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Abstract In this paper we present a model where agents can choose between
productive and rent-seeking activities.We consider two governance institutions:
autocracy and parliament rule. Under autocracy rent-seeking reflects the taste
of the autocrat for such activities. Under parliament rule rent-seeking depends
on parliament voting. We show that under parliament rule the size of rent-
seeking may be larger than under autocracy. This cast doubts on the idea that
“rigth” institutions necessarily promote good economic performance. We also
show that rent-seekers may be interested in overthrowing autocracy.
1 Introduction
This paper studies how governance affects the relative size of productive and
rent-seeking activities. We consider two forms of governance, autocracy or
single ownership, where governance is made by a single agent and corporate
governance or parliamentary rule, where governance is made by majority vot-
ing. Here there are three examples of the kind of situations to which our model
can be applied.
1: Kingdoms. In Europe from the seventeenth century on, some countries
were ruled by the parliament (e.g. Netherlands and Great Britain) while others
(e.g. Spain and Portugal) were absolute monarchies.
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2: Location. In some countries there is a stark contrast between industrial
regions/cities (e.g. Milan, Barcelona) and the capital of the nation (Rome,
Madrid). The folklore attaches to the former the role of industrious people
and to the latter the role of rent-seekers.
3: Governance of a firm. Here we have two regimes: Single ownership and
corporate firms in which the owner is reduced to the role of a powerless supplier
of capital (Berle andMeans 1932). In the latter, decisions are taken by majority
voting by managers sitting on a Board of Directors.
Under autocracy, the single owner collects taxes andprovides theprize sought
by rent-seekers (i.e. land, servants, nobiliary titles, etc.). Active agents might
either be rent-seekers or producers, also called entrepreneurs. Free entry in
rent-seeking and productive activities determines the number of active agents
in each activity. In the case of a kingdom this means that the noble may be
either courtier or entrepreneur. In the case of a firm this means that managers
can either direct a division of the firm or devote time and effort to unproductive
activities at the top. Given an allocation of active agents, the autocrat chooses
a tax rate that maximizes his income. Taxes finance the consumption of the
autocrat and the prize. Given a tax rate, entrepreneurs choose quantities to
maximize profits and rent-seekers choose efforts to maximize payoffs (in an
attempt to obtain the prize). An equilibrium is a situation where all agents
maximize. We prove that such an equilibrium exists, is unique and stable (Prop-
ositions 1 and 2). We find that, depending on the form of demand functions,
exogenous technological progress may increase or decrease the relative size of
rent-seeking (Remark 1).1
Next, we consider Parliament Rule where the decision about the tax rate is
taken by majority voting in a parliament composed of all active agents. Recall
that early parliaments were mainly populated by owners and noblemen. In the
case of a firm, the parliament is the board of directors (BOD). The BOD is com-
posed of agents that either represent the production side, whose salaries are
linked to profits of the division they command, or rent-seekers whose incomes
depend on salaries and perks obtained as BOD members. Under parliament
rule, we assume that a prize might be awarded, provided the necessary taxes are
voted by the parliament. We find that there are two equilibria. In one of those,
rent-seeking activities disappear because the parliament is composed entirely
of entrepreneurs and their most preferred tax rate is zero (Remark 2). This
equilibrium always exists. But there might be another equilibrium in which the
parliament is dominated by rent-seekers. In this case, they vote for a tax rate
that maximizes total revenue. This tax coincides with the tax set by the autocrat.
We provide conditions under which the latter equilibrium exists (Propositions 3
and 4). We find that some of these conditions are plausible. In this equilibrium,
the number of rent-seekers is larger than under autocracy because taxes are
now entirely devoted to producing the prize. Consequently, in this equilibrium,
1 Thus, the rent-seeking sector may decrease for reasons other than governance. We notice that
productivity increased steadily in Europe in the 150 years that preceded the industrial revolution,
North (1981, p. 166).
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the number of entrepreneurs falls and the price of output rises with respect to
those under autocracy (Proposition 5).
Finally, we deal with equilibrium selection, i.e. with the question of which
particular equilibrium actually occurs. We assume that when the autocrat is
deposed, the existing active agents vote in a provisional parliament about taxes.
We see that under not unreasonable conditions they select the tax that max-
imizes income (Proposition 6). This and the previous results point out that
the existence of a parliament is not a sufficient condition for promoting the
productive sector.
We compare our results with others obtained in the literature.
1: Parliaments and rent-seeking: “Absolutist states... such as early modern
Spain, created economic conditions that retarded long-run economic growth”
(North and Weingast 1989, p. 808). This was because under the old regime
rent-seeking was rampant (Ekelund and Tollinson 1981). Conversely, strong
economic performance, like in England and the Netherlands, was the effect of
the rule of parliament with little rent-seeking (North 1990). However, accord-
ing to Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Olson (1982), parliaments can foster
rent-seeking activities. Our model gives some merit to both views since Parlia-
ments might be free from rent-seekers but existence of a parliament is neither
a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for rent-seeking to vanish.
2: Institutions vs. policies: According to the “New Institutional Economics”
good economic performance is the effect of institutions that constraint govern-
ment (North 1981, 1990, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Easterly and Levine 2003 and
Rodrik et al. 2004). This view has been criticized by Glaeser et al. (2004). They
stress the role of human capital and good policies for good economic perfor-
mance. Again our model gives some merit to both views but stress that there is
not a single-valued mapping between institutions and policies.
3: Rent-seeking and economic performance: Murphy et al. (1991) and
Acemoglu (1995) presented models of organizations where productive and
rent-seeking activities coexist. Mohtadi and Roe (2003) study how the size of
productive and rent-seeking activities affect growth focussing on the flow of
information and access to the government. Gradstein (2004) studies the rela-
tionship between growth and the enforcement of property rights whose equi-
librium level is determined by utility maximization of the representative agent.
All these papers are silent on issues of governance which is the main focus of
our paper.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model. Section 3
gathers our results. The paper ends with a section of conclusions which com-
ments on our assumptions and offers some suggestions for future research.
2 In our model machanisms of external controil of the organization are missing (i.e. corrupt par-
liaments can be controlled by voters and corrupt BOD can be controlled by competition), This is
done to highlight the similitudes between parliaments and BOD.
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2 The model
Theorganization produces twokinds of goods: The good sought by rent-seekers,
which we will call the prize (a position in a committee/a duchy) and a differen-
tiated good. There is a sole input (labor/capital) which is the numeraire.
The single owner (autocrat) collects revenues by a tax on output.3 Let t be
the tax rate. The autocrat transforms part of taxes in the prize.
There are N active agents who either organize the production inside the
organization, call them entrepreneurs, or are rent-seekers. Suppose that there
are m entrepreneurs (later on we will explain how the equilibrium value of m
is determined). Each entrepreneur produces a differentiated good and faces an
inverse demand function of the following form,
pi = a − b
⎛
⎝xi + θ
∑
j =i
xj
⎞
⎠
α
− t, with a ≥ 0, α > −1,bα > 0, and 0 < θ ≤ 1,
where pi and xi are the price and output of good i. θ measures the degree of
product differentiation. α is a measure of the curvature of demand function
(inverse demand is concave iff α ≥ 1). b is an inverse measure of the size
of the market since the maximum consumption of the good i obtains when
xi = ((a− t)/b) 1α . The slope of the demand function is determined by the sign of
−αb and thus, it is negative. Assuming, by simplicity, θ = 1 and letting x ≡ ∑ xi,
if α = 1 and b > 0, demand functions are linear in x and if a = 0, b < 0, α < 0,
demand functions are isoelastic in x with elasticity −1/α. Demand functions
might be exogenously determined or derived from the utility maximization of a
representative consumer who supplies the input, pays taxes and consumes the
goods produced.4
Each entrepreneur has access to assets (i.e. technology) that allow him to
convert one unit of input in 1/g units of product. Thus, 1/g is the productivity
of the input in the productive sector. We will assume that (a − g)/b > 0. In
the linear case it means that the marginal cost is below the price that makes
demand zero. In the isoelastic case, it means that the marginal cost is positive.
Profits for i, denoted by Bi, are Bi ≡ (a − b(xi + θ ∑j =i xj)α − t − g)xi.5
Firm i maximizes Bi + γ ∑j =i Bj, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. If γ = 0 the entrepreneurs
act independently. If γ = 1 aggregate profit equals individual profit and the
3 In our model only the owner can set taxes. For a model where active agents can also set taxes see
Rosenthal (Bates et al. 1998).
4 If, for simplicity, we assume that the product is homogeneous, preferences of the consumer are
representable by the following utility function where l is consumption of the input (leisure):
u = ax − bx
α+1
α + 1 − l.
5 In the case of a kingdom profits are spent in the labor market.
4
production sector is a team. Thus, γ reflects the degree of collusion among pro-
ducers. We assume that firms are quantity-setters. First order condition (FOC)
of maximization are
a − t − g − b
⎛
⎝xi + θ
∑
j =i
xj
⎞
⎠
α
− αb
⎛
⎝xi + θ
∑
j =i
xj
⎞
⎠
α−1
xi
−γαbθ
∑
j =i
xj
(
xj + θ
∑
r =j
xr
)α−1
= 0,
It can be shown that second order conditions hold and the system of FOC
has only symmetric solutions. At the unique equilibrium, output and prices are
xi =
(
(a − g − t)(1 + θ(m − 1))1−α
b(1 + θ(m − 1) + α(1 + γ θ(m − 1))
) 1
α
. (2.1)
pi = α(a − t − g)(1 + γ θ(m − 1))1 + θ(m − 1) + α(1 + γ θ(m − 1)) + g. (2.1
′)
Since equilibrium is symmetric, let us denote the market price by p.
Let n (= N − m) be the number of rent-seekers. Let V the value that they
attribute to the prize. Rent-seekers must exert effort in order to attract the
attention of the autocrat. Let Gi be the effort (time spent nearby the autocrat,
cost of banquets, etc.) made by the rent seeker i. The probability that i gets the
prize is
σi = G

i∑n
j=1 Gj
,  ∈ [0, 1].
 measures the responsiveness of σi to efforts (see Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier
1992). If  = 0, σi = 1/n. If  = 1 we have the function proposed by Tullock
(1980). σi can also be interpreted as the fraction of the prize obtained by i.
We assume that the cost of effort, denoted by Ci is linear, Ci = cGi, c > 0.
Thus, payoffs for i are
i = G

i∑n
j=1 Gj
V − cGi.
Given V and n each rent-seeker chooses effort in order to maximize payoffs
taken as given the effort of other rent-seekers. FOC of payoff maximization are
G−1i
∑n
j=1 Gj − G−1i Gi
(
∑n
j=1 Gj )2
V = c, i = 1, 2, ...,n.
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It is easy to see that the second order condition holds and that the system above
only includes symmetrical solutions.6 This yields,
Gi = (n − 1)Vn2c . (2.2)
i = V(n − (n − 1))n2 . (2.2
′)
The utility function of the autocrat is U = (∑ni=1 Gi)βC1−β , 0 < β < 1 where
C is his consumption of the numeraire. The prize is produced by the autocrat
under constant returns to scale. Let e be the average productivity of the input
in the production of the prize. An interpretation is that the prize consists of the
value of the input plus the prestige given by the status achieved with the prize.
In this case, e > 1 reflects the value added by the status.7 Also e reflects the
degree of law enforcement of the laws that provide a legal cover for the prize
owner.
Taxes can be spent either in C or in the production of the prize. Hence
C + V/e = T. Taxes are set by the autocrat. The maximization of his utility can
be made in two steps. First the autocrat maximizes T and, later on he decides
how to divide his income between C and V.
We assume that when the autocrat maximizes T he assumes that the number
of rent seekers is given. This is because the decision to enter one of the two
activities is a long run decision requiring a particular kind of education in the
early youth and so is not likely to be influenced by changes in the tax rate.
In the kingdom model, this may be interpreted as saying that agents cannot
change occupation, only the descendents—perhaps involving an adequate mar-
riage. Under this interpretation agents are families. In the location model, the
interpretation of this assumption is that entrepreneurs and rent-seekers live in
different parts of the country and relocation is costly. In the model of a firm,
the interpretation is that to change profession involves a high transaction cost.
Given that T = t ∑mi=1 xi,
T = t
(
(a − g − t)(1 + θ(m − 1))1−α
b(1 + θ(m − 1) + α(1 + γ θ(m − 1))
) 1
α
m.
The above is the Laffer curve of our economy. Maximization of T amounts
to choosing t to maximize t(a − g − t) 1α subject to 0 ≤ t ≤ a − g (the second
inequality says that output is non-negative, see (2.1)). Given that T is contin-
uous in t and t belongs to a compact set, the maximum exists. The maximum
6 Collusion does not alter the results significatively: If each rent-seeker maximizes i +η ∑j =i j,
0 ≤ η ≤ 1, the equations in the main text hold with  substituted by (1 − η).
7 For the sale of titles in the seventeenth century see North and Weingast (1989), p. 811.
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cannot be located at the extremes, where T = 0, so it must be located at FOC,
(a − g − t) 1α
(
1 − t
α(a − g − t)
)
= 0.
There is only one value of t that solves the previous equation and yields
positive revenue, namely
t∗ = α(a − g)
1 + α . (2.3)
Notice that t∗ > 0 since αb > 0 and a−gb > 0 and t
∗ < a − g because
α/(1 + α) < 1. Denote by T¯ the taxes levied. Now let us study the distri-
bution of T¯ between consumption and the prize. We assume that the auto-
crat correctly anticipates the efforts of rent-seekers as a function of V. Hence
U = ( (n−1)Vnc )β(C)1−β . The utility function can be re-written as U = VβC1−β .
The maximization of utility given T¯ yields C = T¯(1 − β) and V = eβT¯.
Finally, we assume that active agents can freely enter into rent-seeking or
production activities. Assuming for simplicity that n and m are real numbers,
free entry implies that
Bi = i. (2.4)
The game is played in three stages. In the first, active agents decide if they
produce or become rent-seekers. In the second, the autocrat maximizes reve-
nues and builds the prize. In the last stage, effort of rent-seekers and production
takes place.8 The equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium where, in each
stage, each agent assumes that other agents will act optimally in the rest of the
game. Formally,
Definition 1 An autocratic organization is in equilibrium if:
1. No active agent wants to switch occupation, i.e., (2.4) holds for n + m = N.
2. Given n and m, the autocrat maximizes tax revenues, i.e. (2.3) holds.
3. Given n and V, rent-seekers maximize payoffs, i.e. (2.2) holds.
4. Given t and m, the product market is in equilibrium, i.e. (2.1) holds.
Consider now corporate governance. Here there is a parliament (board of
directors) that is composed of all active agents that decide the tax rate bymajor-
ity voting. The autocrat is now a constitutional king (a CEO). He receives an
stipend that for simplicity we assume is zero. The prize is produced and awarded
as before. Rent-seeking is either organized by the autocrat or by rent-seekers
themselves. The new equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2 A corporate governance organization is in equilibrium if:
1. No active agent wants to switch occupation, i.e., (2.4) holds for n + m = N.
2. Given n and m, the parliament decides about t by majority voting.
8 The order of stages is identical to that in many models of Industrial Organization: first location,
followed by the decicion about the tax and, finally, competition.
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3. Given n and V, if there are rent-seekers, they maximize payoffs, i.e. (2.2)
holds.
4. Given t and m, the product market is in equilibrium, i.e. (2.1) holds.
This equilibrium is identical to that of autocracy except that taxes are voted
by the parliament and that there is no consumption of the autocrat.
3 Results
Our first result is the following:
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium for autocracy.
Proof Since Bi = (p − g)xi, Eqs. (2.2′) and (2.4) imply that
(p − g)xi = eβtx(n − (n − 1))n2 or n
2(p − g) = eβt(n − (n − 1))m.
Since t∗ = α(a−g)1+α , from (2.1′) we obtain that
t∗
p − g =
1 + θ(m − 1)
1 + γ θ(m − 1) + α.
Simplifying and taking into account that m = N − n,
n2
eβ(n(1 − ) + ) −
(N − n)(1 + θ(N − n − 1))
1 + γ θ(N − n − 1) − α(N − n) = 0. (3.1)
The left hand side of (3.1) is positive for n = N and negative for n = 0.
Hence, there is a value of n such that (3.1) holds. Such a value is unique since
the left hand side of (3.1) is strictly increasing in n. Given this value of n, the
equilibrium values of xi and Gj are determined by Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2). unionsq
This equilibrium can be regarded as a fixed point of a dynamic process in
which the rate of change in the number of entrepreneurs is an increasing func-
tion of the difference between Bi and i. Let
dm
dt
= h(Bi − i)
where h( ) is sign-preserving. Now, we have the following:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the autocracy is globally stable, i.e. starting
from any m, the system tends to the value of m in (3.1).
Proof In the proof of Proposition 1 it was shown that Bi −i was increasing in
n, and so it is decreasing on m. Since h( ) is sign preserving it follows that dmdt is
a decreasing function of m and this proves the result. unionsq
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Once we know that equilibrium is unique and stable we can embark upon
the job of analyzing the determinants of the relative size between rent-seeking
and productive activities. A measure of this size is the ratio between V and
aggregate production denoted by x ≡ ∑mi=1 xi. This ratio will be denoted by u.
u ≡ V
x
= eβt
∗x
x
= eβt∗ = eβ α(a − g)
1 + α =
eβαb
1 + α
(a − g)
b
. (3.2)
Notice that u does not depend on , γ , θ , b, N and c.9 The effects on u of e
and β are what we expect: For instance a decrease in e, reflecting a weaker
enforcement of laws that provide a legal cover to rent-seeking, decreases the
relative size of it. However the effects of α and (a−g) on u are not that intuitive:
du
dα
= αbeβ
(1 + α)2
a − g
αb
> 0 ⇔ α > 0 ⇔ b > 0.
du
d(a − g) =
eβα
1 + α > 0 ⇔ α > 0 ⇔ b > 0.
The effect of a − g on u depends on the impact of a − g on t∗ since u = eβt∗.
Under isoelastic demand (α < 0) an increase of a−g reduces u because demand
ismore elastic and this lowers the revenuemaximizing tax.Under linear demand
(α = 1) an increase in a − g makes demand less elastic and this increases
the revenue maximizing tax. The explanation of the effect of α on u follows
the previous lines. The bottom line is that technical progress might reduce or
increase rent-seeking. The latter effect is similar to what is called the “Dutch
disease” inwhich an increase in endowments lowers income because it increases
rent-seeking (Baland and Francoise 2000; Torvik 2002). Summing up all these
findings,
Remark 1 In the equilibrium of the autocracy u depends positively on e and β,
is independent of , γ , θ , b, c and N and
sign
du
dα
= sign du
d(a − g) = signα = sign b
Let us now turn our attention to corporate governance. Under this regime
active agents vote the tax rate. Rent-seekers have single peaked preferences
with a maximum at t = t∗. Entrepreneurs have also single-peaked preferences
with the maximum at t = 0. Hence the largest group will impose its most
preferred policy.
Remark 2 IfN > 2,m = N and t = 0 is an equilibriumof corporate governance.
9 Notice that the determinants of u and n are different.We see from (3.1) that n depends positively
on e, β, α, θ and N, negatively on γ and  and is independent of a, b, c and g.
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The proof is obvious: if only entrepreneurs exists, the parliament votes a tax
rate of zero and no entrepreneur would like to switch to rent-seeking because
he would not affect the decision on the tax rate and the prize does not exist.
Let us now study the possibility that rent-seeking exists under parliamentary
rule. If it does, rent-seekers must be a majority in the parliament in order to
impose a positive tax. And if they are such a majority, t∗ will result. In this case,
the equilibrium number of rent-seekers is identical to that under autocracy with
β = 1. This number is determined by (3.1). A general solution to this equation
is too involved, so we will consider two extreme cases: no collusion (γ = 0) and
full collusion (γ = 1). The first case is appropriate for the example of a kingdom
or for a divisionalized firm.
Proposition 3 Suppose γ = 0. Under the following conditions there is an equi-
librium in which rent-seekers dominate the parliament
a) 2e(α − θ + 1) > N(1 − θe)
b) eθ = 1 and 1 + α > θ .
Proof For the time being take  = 1. Write (3.1) with β = 1, and γ = 0 as
n2(1 − θe) + e(2Nθ + 1 − θ + α)n − (θN2 + N − θN + αN)e = 0. If eθ = 1,
n =
−e(2Nθ+1−θ+α)+√e2(2Nθ+1−θ+α)2+4(1−θe)(θN2+N−θN+αN)e
2(1 − eθ)
Tedious algebra shows that 2n > N iff 2e(α − θ + 1) > N(1 − θe). This is Part
a). If eθ = 1 (3.1) reads (2Nθ + 1− θ +α)n = θN2 +N − θN +αN. In this case,
2n > N iff 1 + α > θ .
Finally, let  < 1. As noticed in Footnote 9, n is decreasing on . Thus, if
 < 1 the number of rent-seekers increases in relationship with those in the
case  = 1 and the previous result holds a fortiori. unionsq
Proposition 3 states two sufficient conditions for the parliament to be dom-
inated by rent-seekers.10 The most interesting case is a) that if the product
is homogeneous simplifies to e > 1 and N > −2eα/(e − 1). This holds if the
marginal productivity of the input in the production of the prize is larger than
one—i.e. if the prize has some status associated to it—and if α < 0, N is large.
If α > 0, the first condition suffices. These conditions look reasonable.
Our next proposition studies the case of γ = 1. This scenario is appropriate
for a non-divisionalized firm. To simplify calculations we also assume θ = 1.
10 These conditions are only necessary when  = 1. For instance, if  = 0, it is easily calculated
from (3.1) that when N is large the parliament is almost exclusively populated by rent-seekers.
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Proposition 4 If γ = 1 necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium in which the parliament is dominated by rent-seekers are:
a) e(1 + α)(1 − ) ≥ 1 and  > 0.
b) e(1 + α)(1 − ) < 1 and N < 2e(1 + α)
1 − e(1 + α)(1 − ) .
Proof Write (3.1) with β = γ = 1 as n2 = (1 + α)(N − n)e(n(1 − ) + ), or
(1 + (1 + α)e(1 − ))n2 − e(1 + α)(N(1 − ) − )n = eN(1 + α). Solving for n
n = e(1 + α)(N(1 − ) − ) ±
√
(e(1 + α)(N(1 − ) − ))2 + 4(1 + (1 + α)e(1 − ))eN(1 + α)
2(1 + (1 + α)e(1 − )) .
Tedious algebra shows that n > N/2 iff N(1− e(1+α)(1− )) < 2e(1+α). unionsq
Case a) above holds when e or α are large and  small. Case b) is identical to
1
1 −  > e(1 + α) >
N
2e + N(1 − )
which looks like a rather special case.
Propositions 3 and 4 are the main results of the paper. They show condi-
tions under which rent-seekers dominate the parliament. It is clear that if the
productivity in the production of the prize, e, is large enough these conditions
are satisfied. But if e is not very large, the case γ = 0 requires considerably
weaker conditions than the case γ = 1. This is because competition among
divisions lowers the profit from productive activities and makes rent-seeking
more attractive. From this it follows that divisionalized organizations havemore
chances to be captured by rent-seekers than non divisionalized ones.
The relative size of rent-seeking activities under a parliament dominated by
rent-seekers is determined byEq. (3.2) with β = 1. Therefore, Remark 1 applies
to this case. We now study other properties of this kind of equilibrium.
Proposition 5 When the parliament is dominated by rent-seekers the number of
rent-seekers is larger and the price of output greater than under autocracy.
Proof From Eq. (3.1) is clear that n is increasing in β. Since the only difference
between autocracy and corporate governance when the parliament is domi-
nated by rent-seekers is that in the latter β = 1, the result about n follows.
Lastly, it is easy to see in (2.1′) that p is decreasing in m. unionsq
The logic behind Proposition 5 is that if a parliament is dominated by
rent-seekers, all taxes are spent in building the prize and this attracts more
rent-seekers. This implies a decline in productive activities and hence the price
of output increases. It may be argued that this result is an artifact of our assump-
tion that under corporate governance all taxes are spent on the prize. However,
this assumption can be interpreted more broadly. For instance, if a king is
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deposed and his property sold in auction, there is an extra incentive to be a
rent-seeker.11 Two implications of this proposition are worth noting:
1) The welfare of workers under a parliament dominated by rent-seekers is
smaller than what they enjoyed under absolute monarchy.12
2) If there is a majority of rent-seekers, they might be in favor of depos-
ing the absolute monarch who, from their point of view is nothing but an
intermediary.13
We end this section by studying the problem of which equilibrium is more
likely to occur, i.e. the equilibrium selection. We assume that when the autocrat
is deposed, a provisional parliament forms. This parliament is composed of the
entrepreneurs and rent-seekers under the previous regime. Our result is:
Proposition 6 Under the following conditions the provisional parliament is dom-
inated by rent-seekers
a) If γ = 0, 2βe(α − θ + 1) > N(1 − θβe) or βeθ = 1 and 1 + α > θ .
b) If γ = 1, eβ(1 + α)(1 − ) ≥ 1 and  > 0 or eβ(1 + α)(1 − ) < 1 and
N(1 − eβ(1 + α)(1 − )) < 2e(1 + α).
Proof Notice that e and β enter as a product in (3.1). Thus, all the reasonings
made in Propositions 3 and 4 can be made with e substituted by βe. unionsq
Again, the most plausible condition arises when γ = 0. If the product is
homogeneous and βe > 1, a large N (larger than 2βeα/(βe − 1)) suffices for
this condition to hold. Notice that autocrats with β ′s close to zero are likely to
yield parliaments dominated by entrepreneurs. This provides some background
to the observation that “poor countries get out from poverty through good
policies, often pursued by dictators, and subsequently improve their political
institutions” (Glaeser et al. 2004, p. 271).
4 Conclusion
Themain conclusion of this paper is that the existence of a parliament is neither
necessary nor sufficient condition for the decline of rent-seeking; it is possible
that technical progress makes the finance of rent-seeking activities increasingly
difficult (Remark 1), and the parliament might be dominated by rent-seekers
(Propositions 3 and 4). Also our analysis points out that when an eventual
parliament would be dominated by rent-seekers, rent-seekers are interested in
11 This may explain the large amount of rent-seeking in 19th century Spain. At this time the
property of the church and the commons were auctioned and this provided an extra incentive for
rent-seeking. See Fraile-Balbín (1991) for the role of rent-seeking in the slow development of Spain.
12 This reminds the Marxist belief that workers had little to gain with a burgeoise regime.
13 This analysis, mutatis mutandis, can be applied to the process of decolonization and suggests a
reason for local rent-seekers to fight against colonial powers.
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overturning the absolute king (Proposition 6).14 Finally, the size of rent-seeking
might be larger under parliament rule than under autocracy.
From the historical point of view our conclusions cast doubts on the belief
that the parliament “. . . control over the exercise of arbitrary and confiscatory
power by the Crown”, North and Weingast (1989), p. 804. As these authors
recognize, “the triumph of Parliament raises the issue of why it would not then
proceed to act just like the king” (ibid, p. 817). In the case of the English
parliament subsequent to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 some answers are:
1) That “Parliament represented wealth holders” (ibid, p. 804).
2) That the relative cost of rent-seeking under Parliament is larger than under
absolute monarchy (Ekelund and Tollinson 1981, p. 149).
3) The difficulty of enforcing the laws protecting rent-seekers (Tullock 1992).
All these factors can be seen in our model: The number of rent-seekers in
the provisional parliament in Proposition 6. The role of , the effectiveness of
efforts in rent-seeking in Proposition 4. The role of e, the productivity in the
production of rent-seeking in Proposition 3. In addition, our model points out
two new factors:
1) The degree of monopoly in the product market, which depends on θ—the
degree of product differentiation,α—curvature of demand, and γ—the degree
of collusion. The larger the degree ofmonopoly, given that returns are equalized
in the rent-seeking and the productive sector—the larger the number of entre-
preneurs and the less likely is that the parliament is dominated by rent-seekers.
2) The form of the demand function. The case of α > 0 is favorable to rent-
seekers inRemark 1 (in this case technical progress is favorable to rent-seekers)
and Propositions 3 and 6 (in this case a parliament dominated by rent-seekers
exists with independence of the number of active agents).
From the point of view of the theory of the firm, our main finding is that
we can model corporate governance without any role for mechanism design
and explain executive compensations as the surplus obtained in production and
rent-seeking. Our analysis also suggests that divisionalization may foster rent-
seeking. This has been pointed out in a different context by Scharfstein and
Stein (2000).
We end the paper by suggesting some avenues of research.
1:Wehave assumed that the degree of collusion is independent of the number
of agents. However, the literature on supergames suggests that both variables
are related (Shapiro 1989). It would be interesting to have a model were collu-
sion is endogenous. The same applies to the degree of divisionalization.
2: In a dynamic context, it is not clear how the absolute king can sustain his
standard of living if, in each period, he has to cede part of his property. This
suggest that this kind of regime might not be sustainable in the long run, unless
a continuous inflow of new resources are poured into the system.
14 Ekelund and Tollison suggested that the basic cause of the English Civil War (1642–1651) was
the desire of the Parliament to take over the profits of the rent-seeking activities of the king.
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3: In our model rent-seekers do not perform any productive activity. How-
ever, it would be interesting to model rent-seeking as done by entrepreneurs to
obtain favorable laws restricting competition and/or obtaining subsidies, etc.
4: About 300 years ago, most organizations—i.e. firms, families, universities,
countries—were run by single owners. Many of these organizations in our days
use voting to some degree. It would be interesting to investigate whether the
prominence of voting in all these organizations has a common explanation.
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